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Separation of Powers and
International Executive Agreements
ARTHUR W. ROVINE*
INTRODUCTION
The past few years have witnessed an intense and profoundly impor-
tant debate between the Congress and the executive branch on the subject of
international executive agreements.' Separation of powers issues have
abounded as the Congress, in a mood strongly reminiscent of the Bricker
Amendment conflict of the 1950'S,2 has attempted to gain a greater measure
of control over the executive branch capacity to conclude international
agreements.
There are substantial differences, of course, between the two move-
ments. The Bricker proposals took the form of constitutional amendments
offered by conservative Senators who feared that a liberal administration
might become a party to human rights agreements of which the supporters
of the proposals disapproved. The effort of the 1970's has been headed by
liberal Senators and Congressmen reacting to Vietnam, Watergate and the
general development of presidential primacy in foreign affairs. The current
drive attempts to limit the President's powers by statute, thus avoiding the
practical difficulties of constitutional amendment but concomitantly rais-
ing certain complex constitutional questions.
The prim*, technique favored by the leaders of the 1970's drive is the
"legislative veto" by concurrent or one-House resolution over executive
agreements.8 Variants of this idea have been introduced in the Senate by
*Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs in the Department of State. B.A., 1958,
University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1961, Harvard Law School; Ph. D. 1966, Columbia
University. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and are not
necessarily shared by the Department of State.
'The key documents, statements and debates may be found in Congressional Oversight
of Executive Agreements, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Congressional Oversight of
Executive Agreements-1975, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate
Hearings]; Congressional Review of International Agreements, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Hearings].
2For a convenient listing of the several versions of the Bricker Amendment, as well as
the extensive literature on the Bricker proposals, see W. BIsHoP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-
12 (Sd ed. 1971).
sSee text accompanying notes 115-146 infra. President Ford directed the Department of
Justice to find a suitable court case in which to challenge the constitutionality of legislative
veto provisions. The department intervened before the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia in a case brought originally by Ramsey Clark challenging the Federal Election
Campaign Act, which contains such a provision. A decision is now pending. See Clark v.
Valeo, No. 76-1825 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Senators Bentsen and Glenn, and in the House by Congressmen Morgan
and Zablocki. 4
The viewpoint of the congressional sponsors of the measures, as
expressed in the bills and in congressional hearings, has been that the
executive branch has wrongfully abridged the role of the Congress by
concluding, in the place of treaties or other congressionally approved
agreements, international executive agreements which, in the majority of
cases, are not submitted to Congress for approval.5 Statistics indicating a
growing tendency on the part of the executive branch to use executive
agreements rather than treaties were produced,6 and it was argued repeat-
The best scholarly work on the general issue of the legislative veto, although containing
no references to the problem of international agreements, is Watson, Congress Steps Out: A
Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. Rxv. 983 (1975).
4See text accompanying notes 13-18 infra.
5See, e.g., 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-5 (statement of the Hon. Thomas E.
Morgan, Chairman of the House Comm. on International Relations).6The statistics from 1945 through December 15, 1976 are as follows:
International
Agreements
Other Than
Year Treaties Treaties
1946 19 139
1947 15 144
1948 16 178
1949 22 148
1950 11 157
1951 21 21 3
1952 22 291
1953 14 163
1954 17 206
1955 7 297
1956 15 233
1957 9 222
1958 10 197
1959 12 250
1960 5 266
1961 9 260
1962 10 319
1963 17 234
1964 3 222
1965 14 204
1966 14 237
1967 18 223
1968 18 197
1969 6 162
1970 20 183
1971 17 214
1972 20 287
1973 17 241
1974 13 230
1975 13 264
1976
(as of 12/15/76) 13 385
Figures above compiled by the Office of Treaty Affairs, Department of State.
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edly that the executive branch is concluding far too many significant
arrangements as executive agreements, reserving the treaty route for
relatively minor technical arrangements.
Chairman Morgan of the House International Relations Committee
contended that international agreements had been made without ade-
quately notifying Congress, and that until the passage of the Case-Zablocki
Act7 certain important agreements were kept completely secret from
Congress.8 He also argued that too often Congress was notified of such
agreements without any opportunity to influence their contents. He com-
plained that the Congress "is expected to come up with the money to meet
obligations which it had no voice in creating."9
Members of Congress have also asserted that the executive branch has
fundamentaly altered the consitutional scheme with respect to inter-
national agreements as originally established by the framers of the
Constitution and that, in fact, the framers foresaw only treaties, as is
indicated by the language of the Constitution, rather than executive
agreements which are not submitted to the Congress for its approval.' 0
Others have contended that while executive agreements may be authorized
by statute or prior treaties, the President has only the most limited
independent power to conclude executive agreements pursuant to constitu-
tional powers, and that this limited power has been abused by the executive
branch."
The Congress and the executive branch have also clashed sharply over
the extent to which the President has discretion to decide whether any
important international agreement should be a treaty or executive agree-
ment.'
2
Under the bill 3 introduced by Senator Bentsen on February 7, 1975,
executive agreements would become effective only after a sixty day waiting
71 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. V 1975).
8See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of the Hon. thomas E. Morgan).
In 1950 Congress enacted 1 U.S.C. § 112a (1970), requiring the publication of all international
agreements.
9See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of the Hon. Thomas E.
Morgan).
"0Hearings on S. Res. 486 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976). See also 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1-7 (statement by Senator James
Abourezk, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary
Comm.).
"See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 68-80 (statement by Mr. Raoul Berger);
BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 156-62 (1974).
"This issue was debated primarily through an exchange of memoranda between the
Senate Office of Legislative Counsel and the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State,
on the subject of the 1975 Middle East Agreements. The Senate memoranda took the position
that certain of the agreements entered into by the United States with Israel were illegal and
void ab initio because they were not treaties. See 121 CONG. REc. S20102-14 1975); 122 CONG.
REc. S1687-92 1976).
13S.632, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Bentsen bill reproduces S.3475, 92nd'Cong.; 2d
Sess. (1972), introduced by Senator Ervin on April 11, 1972. For the full text of S.632, see 1975.
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, 243-49.
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period from the date of transmittal of such agreements by the executive
branch to Congress. Any agreement disapproved by a majority vote of both
Houses would not take effect. Curiously enough, however, one section of
the Bentsen bill provides that these requirements are not applicable to any
executive agreements entered into by the President "pursuant to a provision
of the Constitution or prior authority given the President by treaty or
law."'14 This clause would appear to vitiate the bill because almost all
agreements are authorized by prior statute, treaty or the Constitution. Only
a very few agreements are authorized by subsequent statutory approval.
The Glenn bill, 15 introduced on March 20, 1975, is far broader in its
coverage and veto provisions. It contains the same sixty day waiting period
but provides for a veto by the Senate alone. The bill applies to:
any bilateral or multilateral international agreement or understanding,
formal or informal, written or verbal, other than a treaty, which involves,
or the intent is to leave the impression of, a commitment of manpower,
funds, information, or other resources of the United States, and which is
made by the President or any officer, employee, or representative of the
executive branch of the United States Government.'6
A more limited measure was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives on March 6, 1975, by Thomas E. Morgan, 17 then Chairman of the
House Committee on International Relations, and Clement Zablocki, his
successor as Chairman. This bill requires transmittal to the Congress for
its review of all executive agreements concerning the establishment,
renewal, continuation or revision of a "national commitment" as defined
in the bill. The Morgan-Zablocki bill also requires a sixty day waiting
period and the legislative veto by concurrent resolution. The term
"national commitment" is defined to include any agreement or promise (1)
"regarding the introduction, basing or deployment" of United States
Armed Forces on foreign territory or (2) "regarding the provision to a
foreign country, government or people any military training or equipment
14S.632 § 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
15S.1251, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For the full text, see 1975 Senate Hearings, supra
note 1, at 254-61.
16S.1251, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, (1975), reprinted at 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note
1, at 257.
17H.R. 4438, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For the full text of this bill, see 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 1, at 267-71. Several variations were introduced in the House during
1975, including H.R. 1268, 1273, 5489, 5826, 6358, 6744, and 7745. H.R. 1268 required a
concurrent resolution of approval by both Houses during a sixty day waiting period in order
for any executive agreement to enter into force; H.R. 1273 called for a concurrent resolution of
disapproval. H.R. 5489, 6358, 6744, and 7745 all permit the Senate alone, by a resolution of
disapproval, to prevent the entry into force of any executive agreement. H.R. 5826 requires a
resolution of approval by the Senate. For the full text of these bills, see 1976 House Hearings,
Isupra note 1, at 277-93. For the reports of the executive branch on H.R. 4438 and on these
similar bills, see id. at 296-310.
(Vol. 52:397
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including component parts and technology, any nuclear technology or any
financial or material resources."18
A more unusual proposal was introduced on April 14, 1976, by Senator
Clark in his proposed Senate Resolution 434 relating to the treaty powers
of the Senate.' 9 Under this resolution, the Senate would be permitted to
express its opinion as to whether a particular executive agreement should
be a treaty. Once that opinion was ,expressed, unless the Senate approved
the agreement designated a "treaty" by a two-thirds majority, a point of
order procedure would become applicable. Under this procedure, Senate
consideration of any bill authorizing or appropriating funds to implement
that "treaty" would be out of order. Thus, any single Senator raising the
point of order could block the funding for an agreement so designated.
Before analyzing these legislative proposals, it will be useful to review
certain underlying questions relevant to the executive branch practices in
this area of foreign affairs and the fundamental issues raised by the critics
of those practices.
DEFINING AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
One of the more perplexing and surprisingly difficult issues in -this
area, and one which is at the foundation of all subsequent separation of
power questions with respect to international agreements, is the question
of how to recognize an international agreement. This is a matter of far
more than academic importance since United States domestic statutes and
international rules must be observed if the arrangement in question
constitutes an "agreement" within the meaning of the law.
Federal law requires the Secretary of State to publish all treaties and
other agreements to which the United States is a party.20 It also provides
that the United States Statutes at Large shall be legal evidence of, inter alia,
treaties and international agreements other than treaties in all courts of the
United States, the several states and territories and insular possessions.2'
The same status is also given to the Treaties and Other International Acts
Series (TIAS)22
The Case-Zablocki Act,23 adopted in 1972, requires the Secretary of
State to transmit to the Congress the text of any international agreement
other than a treaty to which the United States is a party no later than sixty
days after its entry into force. This is for the information of Congress
IsSee H.R. 4438, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1975), reprinted at 1975 Senate Hearings, supra
note 1, at 270-71.
1gSee 122 CONG. R.c. S5744-46 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1976); 122 CONG. REC. S11415-17 (daily
ed. July 1, 1976) (Senator Clark's resolution was subsequently renumbered as S.Res. 486).
201 U.S.C. § 112a (1970).
211 U.S.C. § 112 (1970).
221 U.S.C. §§ 112a, 113 (1970).
23l U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. II 1972).
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rather than its approval. The United Nations Charter also provides that
every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any United
Nations member is to be published and registered with the Secretariat as
soon as possible.2 4
It therefore makes a good deal of difference to the Congress and to the
world community whether a particular document does or does not
constitute an international agreement. In political terms, the Congress is
in a better position to exert some measure of control, whether through
consultation, funding or subsequent regulation, if a given arrangement
constitutes an agreement within the meaning of the law.
Yet United States law provides no definition of "international agree-
ment." The most authoritative international law statement defines
"treaty" as "[a]n international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation. ' 25 For purposes of international law, there is no
distinction between treaties and executive agreements. This has no effect,
however, on domestic law distinctions between the two forms. Those
distinctions remain legally valid under United States law.2 6
If, however, every international agreement is a "treaty" in the inter-
national law sense, the question remains, "What is an international
agreement?" for purposes of both international law and domestic law.
The Treaties Office in the Department of State is confronted daily with
documents embodying some form of international arrangement, many of
21U. N. CHARTER, art 102. Classified agreements are transmitted to the two foreign
relations committees of the Congress, but they are not, of course, published or registered with
the United Nations. The United States enters into approximately ten to twelve classified
agreements each year. The Case-Zablocki Act provides that:
[A]ny such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the
opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States
shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs [now International Relations] of the House of Representatives under an
appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the
President.
251969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(l)(a). The Convention was sent
to the Senate by President Nixon on November 22, 1971, but has yet to be acted upon by the
Senate. See S. ExEc. Doc. No. L, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). On September 7, 1972, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations reported out a resolution of advice and consent to the
ratification of the Vienna Convention, but subject to an understanding and interpretation
which would, in the view of the executive branch, greatly weaken, if not eliminate, the
distinction under United States domestic law between treaties and executive agreements. The
Department of State opposed the understanding and interpretation, and the Convention has
since remained in the Committee. For details of the Senate action and the Department of State
response, see 1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 195-98 (1975).
261969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(2). This article states: "The
provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present Convention are without
prejudice to the use of those terms or to the meanings which may be given to them in the
internal law of any State."
[Vol. 52:397
SEPARATION OF POWERS
which are informal and routine transactions of a minor nature that are not
thought suitable for publication, transmittal to the Congress and regis-
tration at the United Nations. Yet the great bulk of all United States
agreements, even significant agreements, are silent as to governing law, but
are nevertheless between States and are in written form. The central
problem, then, is how to recognize an international arrangement which is
something different from, or lesser than, an international agreement,
On March 12, 1976, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State sent a
memorandum 27 to key Department personnel and to thie general counsels
of the several government departments and agencies setting forth the
criteria applied by the Legal Adviser in deciding what constitutes an
international agreement for purposes of publication, Case-Zablocki Act
transmittals and registration with the United Nations Secretariat. These
criteria have also been transmitted to the Congress. There appears to be
general agreement throughout the government that, in light of the
statutory requirements, 28 decisions on what constitutes an agreement, and
the requisite determinations, are made by the Department of State.
The criteria are as follows:
1. Intention of the Parties to be Bound by International Law. The
most fundamental requirement is that the parties intend their undertaking
to be legally binding and to be governed by international law. Documents
intended to be political or moral statements, or that are governed by
another legal system, are not international agreements. 29 The latter
requirement is strictly construed. If, as is usually the case, an instrument is
silent as to governing law, it is presumed that international law governs.
2. Significance of the Arrangement. It is agreed by the Congress and
the Department of State that minor or trivial undertakings do not
constitute international agreements. Senator Case excluded "trivia" from
the coverage of Section 112b as did the House report on the Case-Zablocki
Act. 0
There are no detailed guidelines to assist in deciding what level of
significance must be reached; this must remain a matter of judgment,
taking into account the entire context of a particular transaction. As the
"7The memorandum may be found in 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 240-43.
281 U.S.C. § 112a, 112b (Supp. If 1972).
29 Perhaps the most outstanding example of an agreement intended to have political and
moral weight, but not legal force, is the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Cooperation
and Security in Europe. One of the final clauses of the Helsinki pact provides that it "is not
eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations .... 
"
The Helsinki accord was, by agreement of the parties, not legally binding. In the United
States it was therefore not separately published in the TIAS series and not registered with the
United Nations. It was transmitted to the Congress but not under the terms of the Case-
Zablocki Act.
3
sSee H.R. REP. No. 92-1301, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Hearings on S.596 Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1972).
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Legal Adviser noted in his memorandum, it is frequently a matter of
degree. A promise to sell one map to a foreign government is not an
international agreement, while a promise to sell a million maps probably is
an international agreement. A letter from Acting Secretary of State
Kenneth Rush in September, 1973, to all government departments and
agencies provides some guidance. It requires transmittal to the Department
of State for possible transmittal to the Congress of
any agreements of political significance, any that involve a substantial
grant of funds, any involving loans by the United States or credits payable
to the United States, any that constitute a commitment of funds that
extends beyond a fiscal year or would be a basis for requesting new
appropriations, and any that involve continuing or substantial coopera-
tion in the conduct of a particular program or activity, such as scientific,
technical, or other cooperation, including the exchange or receipt of
information and its treatment."'
3. Requisite Specificity, Including Objective Criteria for Determining
Enforceability. An international agreement must have a certain precision
and specificity setting forth the binding undertakings of the parties. As in
domestic contract law, a vaguely worded commitment may well be an
unenforceable promise if there are no objective criteria that can be applied
to enforce it. The Legal Adviser cited a promise "to help develop a more
viable world economic system" as a statement lacking the specificity
required to constitute a legally binding international agreement.3 2
4. The Necessity for Two or More Parties to the Arrangement. Under
international law, unilateral commitments may on occasion be legally
binding, but they do not constitute international agreements even if the
31The full text of the 1973 Rush Leter may be found in 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note
1, at 101-2.
321d. On the other hand, the Legal Adviser noted that "undertakings as general as those
of Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter have been held to create internationally binding
obligations (though not self-executing ones)." Id. Those Articles read as follows:
Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and
international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 56
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with
the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
[Vol. 52:397
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other criteria are met.33 Care must be taken, however, to determine whether
an undertaking is truly unilateral or is part of a larger bilateral or
multilateral set of undertakings. As the Legal Adviser has pointed out,
"parallel 'unilateral' undertakings by two or more states may constitute an
international agreement."3 4
5. Form. Form is normally not a central factor, but it may reflect the
intention of the parties to conclude an agreement or something less.
Documents with formal final clauses, signature blocks, entry into force
dates and the like probably reflect an intent to conclude an international
agreement, while failure to use the customary form might evidence an
intent not to conclude a binding agreement. Obviously, form is not
decisive if the intention is otherwise clear.
These five criteria have proved very helpful in defining, at least in
practical terms, an executive agreement. However, two types of arrange-
ments which have caused difficulty in applying these criteria are agency-
level agreements and implementing agreements. First, many international
arrangements entered into with a foreign nation purport to bind only an
agency of the government rather than the United States Government as
such. It is common, for example, for the Department of Defense to enter
into working level arrangements with the defense ministries of foreign
countries. While there have been variations in prior practice, the
Department of State view is that agency-level agreements are international
agreements if they meet the criteria listed above. Agencies of the
government do not have separate legal personalities, and they can and do
bind the United States Government in international law. On the other
hand, many agency-level agreements are routine technical working
arrangements that frequently do not reach the level of significance required
for an international agreement. The issue is important, however, as so
331n the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia v. France, [1974] I.Cj. 253, the International
Court of Justice stated:
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning
legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations.
Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the
intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound
according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a
legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given
publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context
of international negotiations, is binding. . . . Just as the very rule of pacta sunt
servanda in the law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding character
of an international obligation assumed by unilateral declaration.
Id. at 267-68. The last phrase implies that a binding unilateral obligation is not regulated by
the law of treaties.
341976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 242 (memorandum from Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser, Department of State).
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many departments and agencies are currently signing agreements in their
own name.35
Second, if an arrangement with a foreign government implements an
international agreement and is sufficiently identified in that agreement, the
implementing arrangement will not be treated as a separate international
agreement. The difficulty in most cases is the determination of whether an
implementing arrangement is sufficiently identified in the umbrella
agreement it is designed to implement. The Legal Adviser, in his criteria
memorandum, gave the example of an underlying agreement committing
the United States to sell 1,000 tractors, and a subsequent implementing
arrangement requiring a first installment on this obligation by the sale of
100 tractors of the "brand-x" variety. In such a case the implementing
arrangement would not be subject to the requirements of publication,
transmittal and registration. But suppose the underlying agreement called
for subsequent agreements for agricultural assistance in a general clause
without further specificity. A particular argicultural assistance agreement in
implementation of the general obligation, provided it met the criteria
discussed above, would constitute a separate agreement within the meaning
of the law.
A RESPONSE TO CERTAIN CRITICISMS
The Large Number of Executive Agreements
Most discussions of executive branch practices with respect to inter-
national agreements focus without discussion on the large number of
executive agreements concluded since 1946 and the small number of treaties
each year as evidence of a perceived abuse by the executive branch in a key
area of United States foreign policy making. It is useful, however, to
understand why there are so many more executive agreements than treaties
and why this has been particularly true in the years following the Second
World War.3 6 First and most obvious is the growth in the number of
nations in the world community. In 1945 there were some fifty nations
with which the United States concluded agreements, most of which were in
Europe or Latin America where formal relationships required a substantial
number of treaties as well as lesser agreements. Today there are closer to
150 nations in the world community, and in the great majority of cases the
relationships are such that executive agreements are normally sufficent.3 7
3 5Clearly it is the substance of the arrangement that counts and not its form or its
designation as an agency level or government level agreement. The 1973 Rush Letter was
designed primarily to ensure that the Department of State is made aware of agency-level
arrangements so that it is in a position to transmit to the Congress any that constitute
agreements within the meaning of the law.
s
6See note 6 supra.37For a complete listing of all bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements to which
the United States is currently a party, see TREATIEs IN FORCE, an annual publication of the
[Vol. 52:397
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Second, only in the period following World War II has the United
States become a highly active participant in world politics; this too has
resulted in an increase in the number of executive agreements. Our prior
position in the international community required fewer but more formal
relations with close friends and allies which resulted in a natural tendency
toward treaties instead of executive agreements. This has changed in the
last thirty years as United States activities have demanded a greater number
of less formal arrangements.
Third, there are many more subjects today that are part of the
international agreement making process than in years past. Topics such as
cooperation in health, science, environmental affairs and education are all
matters which today are frequently the subject of international agreements
but were unheard of as international law topics in 1946.38 In most of these
areas treaty relationships are not required, and executive agreements have
generally been accepted as sufficient. Indeed in most cases the agreements
have been authorized by statutory law. Once again the pressure is in the
direction of an increased number of executive agreements, without a
corresponding increase in the number of treaties.
Fourth, differences in definition have also resulted in an increase in the
number of executive agreements. The inclusion of agency-level arrange-
ments which satisfy the criteria discussed above3 9 as international agree-
ments have obviously increased the number of such agreements. Thus, even
definitional changes have contributed to the widening gap.
These factors explain far more about the rapid growth in the number
of executive agreements than a notion that the executive branch has abused
its discretion and has unfairly distorted the constitutional framework
governing the conclusion of international agreements. Consequently, the
charge that the executive branch concludes major agreements as executive
agreements and minor routine technical agreements as treaties is criticism
that does not bear scrutiny.
Significant and Routine Treaties
It is true that several multilateral treaties on routine technical questions
have been concluded, but it is not true that all treaties have been limited to
such matters. For example in the area of arms control, 40 within the last five
Department of State. The most recent volume lists all treaties and agreements in force for the
United States as of January 1, 1977.
38For purposes of comparison, see G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
completed in the early 1940's, M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, completed and
released from 1963 to 1972, and the new annual DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW. Annual DIGEST volumes for the years 1973, 1974 and 1975 have been
released as of this writing.
39See notes 29-35 supra & text accompanying.
4 1See generally ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS (U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency 1975).
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
years the Senate has approved and the President has ratified the Geneva Gas
Protocol,4 ' the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention,42 the 1972 Treaty
between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, 43 and the 1971 Treaty Prohibiting the Emplace-
ment of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor.44 In 1976
the Treaty with the Soviet Union Limiting Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Underground was signed and sent to the Senate,4 5 and the military bases
agreement with Spain was concluded, approved and ratified as a treaty.46
There are also a number of important agreements in other areas sent to
or before the Senate including the Genocide Convention, 47 the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,48 the 1970 Hague Hijacking Con-
vention, 49 and the 1971 Montreal Sabotage Convention.50 In addition, even
treaties on technical matters may be politically important depending upon
the treaty partner and the general context. Thus, recent bilateral tax
treaties with the Soviet Union5 and Romania 52 may be characterized as
important from a political perspective, as may recent consular treaties with
Poland,53 Romania 4 and Hungary. 55
4'Executed at Geneva on June 17, 1925; entered into force for the United States on April
10, 1975. T.I.A.S. No. 8061; 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
42Executed at Washington, London and Moscow on April 10, 1972; entered into force for
the United States on March 26, 1975. T.I.A.S. No. 8062.
4sSigned at Moscow on May 26, 1972; entered into force October 3, 1972. 23 U.S.T. 3435;
T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
44Executed at Washington, London and Moscow on Feb. 11, 1971; entered into force for
the United States on May 18, 1972. 23 U.S.T. 701; T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
4sSigned at Washington and Moscow May 28, 1976. The treaty was sent to the Senate by
President Ford on July 29, 1976, along with the 1974 Treaty with the Soviet Union on the
Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests. See S. EXEc. Doc. No.N, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976).
46Signed at Madrid on Jan. 24, 1976; entered into force on Sept. 21, 1976. T.I.A.S. No.
8360.
47See International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, S. Exac.
REP. No. 5, 93d Cong., 1si Sess. (1973).
48PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, S.
EXEC. Doc. No. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
"Entered into on Dec. 16, 1970. 22 U.S.T. 1641; T.I.A.S. No. 7192.5 0Entered into on Sept. 23, 1971. 24 U.S.T. 565; T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
5Convention on Double Taxation, Taxes on Income, June 20, 1973, United States-
Soviet Union, T.I.A.S. No. 8225.2Convention on Double Taxation, Taxes on Income, Dec. 4, 1973, United States-
Romania, T.I.A.S. No. 8228.53Consular Convention, May 31, 1972, United States-Poland, 24 U.S.T. 1231; T.I.A.S.
No. 7642.
-"Consular Convention, July 5, 1972, United States-Romania, 24 U.S.T. 1317; T.I.A.S.
No. 7643.
51Consular Convention, July 7, 1972, United States-Hungary, 24 U.S.T. 1141; T.I.A.S.
No. 2641.
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Consultation with Congress
A third basic criticism of the executive branch, according to congres-
sional observers, 56 has been its failure to consult with the Congress. It
should be noted here that in the vast majority of cases, Congress does not
wish to consult simply because most agreements are of a routine technical
nature without political significance. In any given calendar year there are
not likely to be more than half a dozen or so truly important agreements in
which the Congress has a substantial interest. While judgments have
clearly varied on this point, it seems that a serious effort has been made by
the executive branch to consult with the Congress. The most recent and
generally acclaimed successful example of this is the 1976 Spanish Bases
Treaty. Despite the general charge no specific cases have been cited in
which the Congress has been expected to fund obligations it had no voice
in creating. There have been certain important agreements, such as the
1975 Sinai Accords, in which assistance was specifically made contingent
upon the availability of funds. 57 Such agreements, which are not un-
common, constitute a very limited United States commitment in which the
foreign nation is obviously placed in the position of having to take its
chances with the Congress. Under such circumstances, while the executive
branch is obliged to seek the required funding, there is no obligation on
the part of Congress to provide the funds.
On several occasions the Department of State has suggested to the
Congress that the two branches develop more detailed rules with respect to
an ongoing and mutually agreeable system of consultation. 58 Consultation
with whom, on what subjects and for what precise purpose and effect are
complex questions which will require serious effort to resolve, but this
effort and a system of close cooperation which may arise from it are the
most promising approaches to a satisfactory system of international
agreement making by the United States Government.
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Intention of the Framers of the Constitution
Most of the arguments presented by or to the Congress in support of
the proposition that executive agreements were not intended by the framers
56See, e.g., 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Hon. Thomas E.
Morgan, Chairman, Committee on International Relations).
57See 122 CONG. REc. S1687-92 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1976) (Department of State Assistant
Legal Adviser's Reply to the Second Memorandum of the Senate Office of Legislative Counsel
concerning certain Middle East agreements).
58See, e.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal
Adviser of the Department of State); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 261 (1972) (statement of John
Stevenson, Legal Adviser of the Department of State).
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of the Constitution to be a proper mode of concluding international
agreements have focused on the discussions at the Constitutional Con-
vention.5 9 Indeed, the discussions at Philadelphia do indicate that the
framers were thinking in terms of the necessity for Senate approval of all
international agreements prior to their taking effect. Yet the practice of
those framers of the Constitution who went on to become President
indicates in striking fashion that at least those Founding Fathers quite
clearly viewed the executive agreement as a constitutionally appropriate
method for concluding international agreements, even on important
subjects. 60 In fact, even under the Articles of Confederation, which gave
Congress far more control over international agreements than did the
Constitution, important executive agreements were concluded.
61
In 1792, only three years after the adoption of the Constitution,
Congress adopted legislation approved by President Washington autho-
rizing the Postmaster General to conclude international agreements for
reciprocal delivery of mailed matter.6 2 Clearly, if that statute and the
countless others that authorize executive agreements are constitutional,
then the Constitution must permit international agreements other than
treaties. Today, Department of State figures show that fully eighty-six
percent of all executive agreements of the United States are authorized by
statute.63
The early practice also indicates that the Founding Fathers viewed as
appropriate certain executive agreements authorized not by statutory law,
but solely by the Constitution. 64 President John Quincy Adams concluded
a claims agreement with the Netherlands in 1799 without benefit of
statutory or treaty authority. 65 President James Madison, a key framer of
591n particular, see 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 17-38 (statement of Professor
Arthur Bestor); Id. at 68-80 (statement by Mr. Raoul Berger).
60For the full text of a Department of State memorandum on the intention of the framers
of the Constitution with respect to international agreements other than treaties, see 1976
House Hearings, supra note 1, at 164-67.61The Department of State memorandum on the intention of the framers pointed out
that the Preliminary Articles of peace between the United States and Great Britain were
concluded as as executive agreement on November 30, 1782. This agreement brought
hostilities to an end. See 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 96 (1H. Miller ed. 1931) [hereinafter cited as TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AcTS]. In 1786 the United States and Morocco entered into ship signal agreement as an
executive agreement. Id. at 219. In 1784 the United States, at the direction of Congress,
amended a treaty of amity and commerce with France by means of an executive agreement. See
id. at 158; W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 37-38 (1941) [hereinafter cited
as INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS].62Act of Nov. 1, 1791, 1 Stat. 239.
63Compiled by and available at the Office of Treaty Affairs, Department of State.64See notes 100-102 infra &c text accompanying.
65There was a treaty relationship with the Netherlands, but the treaty did not authorize
executive agreements. As later noted by a leading authority:
[T]his agreement with the Netherlands (which would now be called an Executive
agreement) is the first instance of a definitive settlement of a claim of an American
citizen against a foreign government by diplomatic negotiation, fixing the amount;
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the Constitution and a strict constructionist, concluded an agreement with
Great Britain in 1813 for an exchange of prisoners of war.66
President James Monroe concluded the famous Rush-Bagot Agreement
with Great Britain in 1817, although the Senate believed the agreement
should have been a treaty. One year after he concluded and implemented
this highly important agreement to limit armaments on the Great Lakes,
President Monroe inquired of the Senate whether it was "such an
arrangement as the Executive is competent to enter into by the powers
invested in it by the Constitution, or is such an one as requires the advice
and consent of the Senate... .,'67 The very language of this question reveals
that Monroe believed that at least certain kinds of agreements might be
concluded by the President pursuant solely to his independent constitu-
tional powers. In a conversation with John Quincy Adams, Monroe said
that it was "unnecessary" to communicate the Rush-Bagot agreement to
the Congress. 68
This early practice is obviously important as a "contemporaneous
construction" by Presidents who were closer to the writing of the
Constitution than those today, and who clearly approved and acted upon
the conviction that executive agreements are permitted by the Constitu-
tion. 69
and it is the earliest precedent for the practice later settled and now undoubted, that
submission of such agreements to the Senate is unnecessary.
5 TRiTIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL Acrs, supra note 61, at 1079.
"This agreement contains lengthy and detailed provisions on the treatment of
noncombatants, the parole, safety, and sustenance of prisoners, and the methods for effecting
the transfers. For the text and history of this executive agreement, see 2 TPRETiES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACrs, supra note 61, at 557-73.
671976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 165 (contained in the memorandum from the
Department of State).
68McClure refers to the Rush-Bagot agreement as "By far the most famous and
significant of the early executive agreements." INTERNATIONAL EXEcuTIvE AGREEMENTS, supra
note 61, at 49. It entered into force on April 29, 1817, and the Senate approved it almost one
year later on April 16, 1818, after it had been implemented. In the Memoirs of John Quincy
Adams there appears the following statement:
Met and spoke to Mr. Bagot this morning on my way to the President's. He asked
me if it was the intention of the President to communicate to Congress the letters
which had passed between the Secretary of State and him (Bagot) containing the
arrangements concerning armaments on the Lakes, which he said was a sort of
treaty. I spoke of it to the President, who did not think it necessary that they should
be communicated.
2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs, supra note 61, at 647.
The Department of State memorandum also points out that the Rush-Bagot agreement
was first proposed by President James Madison, who instructed Secretary of State Monroe to
come to an "immediate" agreement. The instructions and Monroe's letters, which use the
phrases "immediate effect," "immediate suspension," and "an order will be issued imme-
diately," show that a treaty could not have been contemplated. There is no reference in the
entire correspondence to advice and consent of the Senate. Even after the Senate approved the
agreement almost a year after it had already been implemented, Monroe did not exchange
ratifications with Great Britain, as is the normal procedure for bringing treaties into full force
and effect. 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 166-67 (memorandum from the Department
of State).
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Authority of the President to Enter Into Executive
Agreements Pursuant to, His Independent Constitutional Powers
Assuming that international agreements other than treaties may
appropriately be concluded, the question arises concerning the precise legal
authority for such agreements. As noted, Department of State records
indicate that eighty-six percent of all executive agreements are authorized
by statute.7 0 Such agreements are sometimes known as "Congressional-
Executive agreements" and may be authorized by prior statute or by joint
resolution of the Congress subsequent to negotiation. Other executive
agreements are authorized by treaties or by some combination of treaty and
statute.71  There are also a number of agreements authorized by a
combination of statute and the Constitution. The category which has
generated the greatest concern, however, is comprised of those agreements,
numbering no more than two to three percent of the total, concluded by the
President pursuant solely to his independent constitutional power. These
agreements are sometimes characterized as "pure" or "sole" executive
agreements. 72
While the Constitution does not specifiy that the President may enter
into such agreements, it has been generally accepted that the several
provisions which together comprise the basis for the foreign relations
power of the President authorize international agreement making as part of
that power. These provisions are:
1) "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." 73
2) "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy. .. .
3) "[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers [and]
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed .... ,,75
The Department of State, in a report to the Congress in 1892 on the history of the Rush-
Bagot agreement, said:
The arrangement thus effected seems not to have suggested at the time any doubts as
to its regularity or sufficiency, or as to the entire competence of the executive branch
of the Government to enter into it and carry out its terms.
H.R. Doc. No. 471, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1892).
69Raoul Berger has written that "[rlespect for contemporaneous construction is deeply
rooted in the past. In 1454 Chief Justice Prisot stated, 'the Judges who gave these decisions in
ancient times were nearer to the making of the statute than we now are, and had more
acquaintance with it.' " Several cases for this proposition are cited by Mr. Berger. R. BERGER,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 145 (1974).7
°See note 63 supra.7 1These figures are compiled in a study by and available at the Office of Treaty Affairs,
Department of State.72See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 173-84 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as FOREIGN AFFAIRS].
73 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
74U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
75U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
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There are no Supreme Court cases or other authoritative rulings which
list these provisions as empowering the President to conclude agreements,
but these provisions have been accepted by authorities, such as the
American Law Institute76 and other scholars,7 and by long and unchal-
lenged practice.7 8
It might be useful here to set forth illustrations of agreements
concluded under these provisions. First, the "executive power" clause pro-
vides a wide basis of power for the making of executive agreements. Agree-
ments to consult with another nation on a given subject may be authorized
solely by the "executive power" clause.7 9 Agreements for a waiver of claims, 8 0
payments on outstanding bonds,81 corrections of earlier agreements, and
many other relatively minor technical agreements made necessary by the
daily business of the United States Government could be listed.82
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 121,
Comment a (1965). The American Law Institute lists these constitutional provisions and
states that "[t]hese expressed powers afford the President a broad area in which to make
international agreements. Under the 'executive power,' the President has authority to conduct
the foreign relations of the United States; that power provides a broad constitutional basis for
the making of executive agreements." Id.
7tMcDougal & Lans list the same articles of the Constitution as the basis for the
President's constitutional authority to conclude international agreements without the benefit
of statutory or treaty authority. McDougal & Lans, Treaties & Congressional-Executive or
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181,
246-48 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Treaties &" Presidential Agreements]. These provisions are
also listed in INT'RNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, supra note 61, cbs. 9-10.
78The Department of State has long referred to these provisions in Circular 175
Procedures § 721, 11 Foreign Affairs Manual § 721, reprinted in 1976 House Hearings, supra
note 1, at 392-93, and has not been challenged by either the legislative or judicial branches of
the government, or by scholars.
79See, e.g., Consultations on Maritime Transportation, Sept. 18 & 20, United States-
Brazil, T.I.A.S. No. 6559.80See, e.g., Claims Agreement, April 14, 1949, United States-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 1911.
$'See, e.g., Modification of Finance Agreement, May 14, 1946, United States-Haiti,
T.I.A.S. No. 1521; Amendment of Finance Agreement, Sept. 30, 1946, United States-Haiti,
T.I.A.S. No. 1599; Agreement on Finances, July 4, 1947, United States-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No.
1643; Waiver of Finance Claims, Oct. 1, 1947, United States-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No. 1862.821 n 1905 John Bassett Moore wrote:
The conclusion of agreements between governments, with more or less formality, is
in reality a matter of constant practice, without which current diplomatic business
could not be carried on. A question arises as to the rights of an individual, the
treatment of a vessel, a matter of ceremonial, or any of the thousand and one things
that daily occupy the attention of foreign offices without attracting public notice;
the governments directly concerned exchange views and reach a conclusion by
which the difference is disposed of. They have entered into an international
"agreement"; and to assert that the Secretary of State of the United States, when he
has engaged in routine transactions of this kind, as he has constantly done since the
foundation of the government has violated the constitution because he did not make
a treaty, would be to invite ridicule. Without the exercise of such power it would be
impossible to conduct the business of his office.
Moore, Treaties & Executive Agreements, 20 POL. SCi. Q. 385, 389-90 (1905). Moore's
statement is descriptive of agreements of an informal nature. Moore also supported the right
of the President to conclude agreements of a more formal nature pursuant to his independent
constitutional powers.
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The "executive power" clause may also authorize more significant
agreements such as provisional boundary settlements, provisional arrange-
ments pending final action on basic instruments of international organi-
zations,83 and claims agreements.8 4 The "executive power" clause may
authorize agreements to carry out a statutory or treaty provision which,
while not expressly authorizing an executive agreement, nevertheless
requires the President to take some action involving activity with another
nation or a program of international cooperation. 5
The President has also concluded agreements under the "executive
power" clause which are not inconsistent with legislation even in areas
where the Congress has responsibility, such as the power to regulate
foreign commerce. Of course, statutory authority may be necessary to give
such agreements the force of domestic law. 6
The "Commander in Chief" clause has authorized a large proportion
of "pure" executive agreements. Such agreements commonly provide for
the conduct of military operations,8 7 but the "Commander in Chief" clause
may also authorize agreements in peacetime.8 8 Perhaps the most famous
example of the latter is the 1940 Hull-Lothian Agreement 9 between the
83See 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (1970). An example of the
latter is the interim arrangement with the United Nations regarding establishment of the
United Nations headquarters, Dec. 18, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1677.841t is accepted in U.S. law that:
The President, being entrusted with the right of conducting all negotiations with
foreign governments, is the sole judge of the expediency of instituting, conducting
or terminating them in respect of reclamations for injuries sustained by citizens
abroad. Agreements for the adjustment or settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens
against foreign governments, which meet with the approval of the claimants, and by
which no obligations, except to relinquish the claim, is assumed on the part of the
United States, are not usually submitted to the Senate ....
S. CRANDELL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING & ENFORCEMENT 108 (2d ed. 1916).
8SFor example, Section 3(a) of the Peace Corps Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2502 (Supp. V 1975),
provides: "The President is authorized to carry out the programs in furtherance of the
purposes of this Act, on such terms and conditions as he may determine." The statute does
not explicitly authorize executive agreements, but clearly the President is obligated to
implement a program requiring cooperation with foreign nations. This clause, in addition to
the "executive power" clause of the Constitution, is the authority for the many Peace Corps
agreements concluded by the United States.86Examples are the Long Term Agreement on Economic, Industrial and Technical
Cooperation with the Soviet Union, June 29, 1974, T.I.A.S. No. 7910; the Grains Agreement
with the Soviet Union, Oct. 20, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8206; and the Agreement on Debt
Rescheduling with Indonesia, March 16, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7092.
r
7The American Law Institute points out in its commentary to Section 121 of the
Restatement that "[A] large proportion of the international agreements made under the
powers of the President and intended to create legal relationships under international law
have been based on his power as commander-in-chief and have provided for the conduct of
military operations with allies of the United States." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW § 121, Comment at 379 (1965). See Tucker v. Alexandriff, 183 U.S. 424, 435
(1901).
88See Treaties & Presidential Agreements, supra note 77, at 246-47.
8955 Stat. 1560 (March 27, 1941), reprinted in 12 BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 560 (1974).
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United States and Great Britain under which, in return for a ninety-nine
year lease of certain sites for naval bases on British possessions in the West
Atlantic, the United States transferred to Great Britain fifty overage
destroyers. There was an option for the United States to use such bases but
no commitment or obligation to do so.90
The constitutional provision requiring the President to receive ambas-
sadors and other public ministers9 is the basis for the authority of the
President to recognize foreign governments and to enter into recognition
agreements. The recognition power supports the corollary power to enter
into agreements for settling outstanding problems, such as claims, at the
time of recognition. 92
The constitutional provision obligating the President to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed" 93 overlaps to a great extent with the
"executive power" clause insofar as the latter provision authorizes agree-
ments to implement a statute or treaty which does not expressly authorize
an agreement, but which requires some program or activity of international
cooperation. 94
While the scope of the President's power to conclude such agreements
is a very difficult question which has not yet been settled, the legal right of
the President to enter into some agreements pursuant solely to his
independent constitutional powers is not open to question. That legal
right has been recognized by the Supreme Court, Congress, scholars and by
a long practice dating from the first executive agreements concluded by
those Founding Fathers who became President. 95
Two leading cases in this context are United States v. Belmont9 6 and
United States v. Pink.97 The question before the Supreme Court in both
cases was whether a "pure" executive agreement, known as the Litvinov
Assignment, could override an inconsistent New York law. The answer
given by the Court in both cases was yes. The most striking statement of
90More recent examples of agreements concluded under the Commander in Chief power
include the Four Power agreement ending the Berlin Blockade, May 4, 1949, T.I.A.S. No.
1915; the Korean Armistice Agreements, July 27, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2781, 2782; agreements
with the Soviet Union relating to the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas, May
25, 1972, T.I.A.S. No. 7379, and May 22, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 7624; and Agreements on Ending
the War and Restoring Peace in Viet Nam, Jan. 23, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 7542; March 2, 1973,
T.I.A.S. No. 7568; June 13, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 7674.
9'U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
92See notes 96-99 infra & text accompanying.
9U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
94See Dean, The Bricker Amendment & Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 32 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 1, 2, 11 (1958).
95For the text of a memorandum dated October 31, 1975, by Monroe Leigh, Department
of State Legal Adviser, on the authority of the President to conclude executive agreements
pursuant to his independent constitutional powers, see 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at306-11.
96301 U.S. 324 (1937).
97315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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the legal efficacy of this executive agreement came from Justice Sutherland
who held in Belmont that while the express language of the Constitution
established that treaties could override inconsistent state law:
The same rule would result in the case of all international compacts and
agreements from the very fact that complete power over international
affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to
any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states .... In
respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of
our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes
the State of New York does not exist .... 91
In the Pink case Justice Douglas said for the Supreme Court that "a
treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, cl. 2) of
the Constitution. Such international compacts and agreements as the
Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity." 99
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States indicates that "[a]n international agreement
made by the United States as an executive agreement without reference to a
treaty or act of Congress may, subject to the limitations indicated in § 117,
deal with any matter that under the Constitution falls within the
independent powers of the President."100 Furthermore, such an interna-
tional agreement must deal with a matter "of international concern" and
must not contravene any constitutional limitations applicable to all powers
of the United States. 01
Scholars as well, without extended debate, have acknowledged the right
of the President to conclude agreements upon subject matters within the
scope of his independent constitutional powers. 10 2 Even some congres-
sional critics of executive branch practices in this area have not dis-
agreed; 03 the sponsors of the Morgan-Zablocki bill asserted that the bill
should not deny the right of the President to conclude agreements pursuant
to his independent constitutional powers. 04
98301 U.S. at 331 (citation omitted).
9315 U.S. at 229-30.10 0RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 121 (1965).
1°1Id., § 117.
"02See, e.g., Treaties & Presidential Agreements, supra note 77, at 245-46; THE CoNsTrrrtrIoN
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 484 (Corwin ed. 1964); W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL
LAW 102 (3d ed. 1971).
10For example, during the hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
on S. 596, which subsequently became the Case-Zablocki Act, Senator Case, in a discussion of
armistice agreements made by the President pursuant to his independent constitutional
powers, said: "I don't question that it is within the President's authority." Hearings on S.596
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1971).
104Chairman Morgan stated that the Morgan-Zablocki Bill (H.R. 4438) "should not be a
blanket denial of a President's right to enter into some executive agreements solely on his own
authority under the Constitution. Rather, it should assert the constitutional authority of
Congress to have a voice in the making of certain agreements." See 1976 House Hearings,
supra note 1, at 4.
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Choice of Treaty or Executive Agreement
Another of the complex problems involved in the law of international
agreements is the choice between treaty or executive agreement. What
agreements should be submitted to the Senate as treaties? What agreements
may be entered into as executive agreements without prior or subsequent
approval of the Congress? How is the executive branch to decide?
Guidelines published by the Department of State set forth the several
legal and political variables examined by the executive branch in deter-
mining whether a particular agreement should be a treaty or an executive
agreement:
a. The extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks
affecting the nation as a whole;
b. Whether the agreement is intended to affect state laws;
c. Whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment
of subsequent legislation by the Congress;
d. Past United States practice as to similar agreements;
e. The preference of the Congress as to a particular type of agreement;
f. The degree of formality desired for an agreement;
g. The proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt
conclusion of an agreement, and the desirability of concluding a routine or
short-term agreement; and
h. The general international practice as to similar agreements. 105
It is clear that none of these factors standing alone are sufficient in any
given case and that a particular agreement may involve conflicting
considerations. Some variables may point to a treaty and some to an
executive agreement. There are no hard and fast legal rules distinguishing
between the two forms, and obviously, provided that an agreement is
authorized by statute, treaty or the Constitution, the President has some
discretion to choose between treaty and executive agreement.
This element of discretion should not be taken to imply a totally free
choice on the part of the President. As the Legal Adviser of the Department
of State has noted, the President "is expected to adhere to the customs and
practices which have developed since the conclusion of the first executive
agreements in the early years of the Republic."10 6 He has noted that the
President's determination is shaped by general standards and usages that
have evolved over the years and that the President will rarely disregard this
''common law."
105Circular 175 Procedures § 721.3, 11 Foreign Affairs Manual § 721.3 (1974), reprinted in
1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 392-93. The Circular 175 Procedure is an internal
Department of State regulation and does not have the force of law or of federal regulation. It is
binding on the officials of the Department of State.
106121 CONG. REc. S20103 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1975) (memorandum of the Department of
State); 122 CONG. RFc S1687 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1976) (memorandum of the Department of
State).
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It is generally accepted in United States constitutional practice that
agreements bf exceptional national importance will be treaties rather than
executive agreements, although history demonstrates that many important
agreements were not submitted as treaties. 10 7 Subject matters for which
there is no statutory, treaty or constitutional authority to conclude
executive agreements are dealt with through the treaty mechanism. Even in
such cases, however, an executive agreement could appropriately be
approved by a subsequent act of Congress. Subject matters within the
competence of the states of the Union, and where an agreement will effect
state law, are normally concluded as treaties, but as noted above, the
Supreme Court has twice held that executive agreements may override
inconsistent state law. 08 Agreements requiring enactment of subsequent
legislation by the Congress are most frequently submitted as treaties,
although again it is appropriate in this context to conclude executive
agreements subject to statutory authority or approval by joint resolution.
As part of the negotiating process, political'considerations must often
be taken into account by the President in making the decision; such
considerations normally do not lend themselves to the formulation of
precise rules of law. The degree of formality, for example, desired for any
1071n 1969 the Senate adopted the National Commitments Resolution, S. 85, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969), which provides, in relevant part, that "[A] national commitment by the
United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative
branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent
resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment." It is clear
from this Resolution that the Senate was not saying that a treaty is required for every national
commitment, but rather that a statute or concurrent resolution may be appropriate
alternatives. Statutes, of course, may authorize executive agreements. The Resolution does
not eliminate the problem of choosing between treaty and executive agreement.
Important executive agreements are not a recent development in United States practice; it
has been noted that the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 limited armaments on the Great Lakes.
In a well known statement on the matter, Professor Quincy Wright said:
"Importance" and "dignity" are hard words to define, but the United States annexed
Texas and Hawaii, ended the first world war, joined the International Labor
Organization, the Universal Postal Union and the Pan American Union, settled
over ten billion dollars worth of post-World War I debts, acquired Atlantic naval
bases in British territory during World War II, acquired all financial claims of the
Soviet Union in the United States, joined the United Nations pledging itself not to
make separate peace in World War II and to accept the Atlantic Charter, submitted
over a score of cases to international arbitration, and modified the tariff in
numerous reciprocal trade agreements, by means other than the treaty-making
process.
See Treaties & Presidential Agreements, supra note 77, at 237-38.
108Professor Henkin has written:
Whatever their theoretical merits, it is now widely accepted that the Congressional-
Executive agreement is a complete alternative to a treaty: the President can seek
approval of any agreement by joint resolution of both houses of Congress instead of
two-thirds of the Senate only. Like a treaty, such an agreement is the law of the
land, superseding inconsistent state laws as well as inconsistent provisions in earlier
treaties, in other international agreements or acts of Congress.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 72, at 175. For a discussion of the Supreme Court cases, see notes
96-104 supra & text accompanying.
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given agreement is a policy consideration which must weigh heavily in the
President's final choice. This variable necessarily requires an appreciation
of the relationship between this country and its agreement partner or
partners which is not reducible to a clear legal norm. Speed is another
important political consideration in ceasefire and other military or
emergency agreements. Ceasefire agreements must be timed precisely to the
hour and minute, and are therefore concluded as executive agreements
rather than treaties even though they may be of exceptional international
importance. Agreements dealing with the actual military conduct of war
may be of crucial significance for the nation, and yet no one has seriously
suggested that these agreements must be treaties.
It is notable that the choice of form in the United States has never been
regulated by law. There are no judicial decisions on the matter, no statutes
or federal regulations and only a few discussions of the issue in
congressional debate 0 9 or legal literature.11 0
Indeed, congressional experts have agreed with the view that the
executive branch has some discretion in the matter. Senator Sam Ervin's
Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, after lengthy hearings in 1972 on this subject, wrote:
American constitutional law recognizes, in the Constitution itself and in
judicial opinion, three basic types of international agreement. First in
order of importance is the treaty, an international bilateral or multilateral
compact that requires consent by a two-thirds vote of the Senate prior to
ratification. . . .Next is the congressional-executive agreement, entered
into pursuant to statute or to a preexisting treaty. Finally, there is the
10In 1952, Senator Bricker of Ohio, upon introducing a version of his proposed
constitutional amendment, said:
I found it very difficult in my own mind to define an executive agreement, or what
ought to be an executive agreement, and what ought to be encompassed by a treaty.
... No attempt is made in the amendment to define the subject matter appropriate
for an executive agreement. It is probably impossible to draw a satisfactory line of
demarcation even in a statute. It would be unwise to make the attempt in a
constitutional amendment."
82 CONG. REc. S927 (1952).
n0Similarly, Arthur Sutherland, Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School, wrote as
follows:
Two things are certain: they [executive agreements] have been used from the earliest
days of the independence of the United States; and thoughtful men have during all
that time been unable to supply what the Constitution lacks - a clear distinction
between what is appropriate matter for executive agreement, and what should be
handled by treaty with Senatorial concurrence.... We are as pnzzled as President
Monroe was in 1818. If we knew what was essentially treaty-like, we could define
executive agreements by exclusion; but it is no more possible in our day than in his
to define one unknown in terms of another.
Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1324 (1952). Professor
Henkin has written that failure to obtain the consent of the Senate to an international
agreement cannot be a manifest violation of the Constitution "since no one can say with
certainty when it is required." FOREIGN ArFrAis, supra note 72, at 427.
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"pure" or "true" executive agreement, negotiated by the Executive entirely
on his authority as a constituent department of government.
It is the prerogative of the Executive to conduct international
negotiations; within that power lies the lesser, albeit quite important,
power to choose the instrument of international dialog.'
It is important to note here that the House of Representatives, not
surprisingly, is somewhat less enthusiastic about treaties than the Senate.
The House has a potentially far more significant role to play with respect
to executive agreements since it may approve them as part of the legislative
process either before or after their negotiation. For example, the pressure
on the Department of State to conclude the 1976 agreement with Spain as a
treaty came entirely from the Senate. Indeed, members of the House
International Relations Committee viewed the choice of a treaty in this case
as a usurpation of the role of the House since the treaty contains a
multiyear commitment of funds. Representative Zablocki stated that H.R.
4438:
[rjesponds to the fact that the exedutive branch has for the last two decades
usurped the legislative powers of Congress. That has been demonstrated
most recently in the Spanish base treaty in which the Executive included
language constituting a multiyear authorization of appropriations. In
effect, the Executive is legislating in a treaty." 2
Representative Zablocki would have preferred an executive agreement
subject to the approval of both houses.
On the other hand, the Senate is just as likely to prove jealous of its
prerogatives. Senator Clark, upon introducing his treaty powers resolu-
tion"3 on April 14, 1976, stated that the Morgan-Zablocki bill "represents a
clear invasion of the treaty power of the Senate. The authority to advise
UlSuBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D
CONG., lsT SEss., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 6 (Comm. Print 1973)
(emphasis added).
1121976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 219-20. The rules of the House of
Representatives provide that a ratified treaty may serve as an authorization for a subsequent
appropriation of funds. See MANUAL OF RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No.
416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Rule XXI, ff 2 at 543 (1975); 4 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES § 3587 (1907).
Over the years there have been many treaties which served as authorization for the
payment of funds, including the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, United States-
United Kingdom, T.S. No. 119; the Treaty of Peace with Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, T.S. No. 343;
and the Panama Canal Treaties: Harz-Banan Varilla Treaty, Nov. 18, 1903, T.S. No. 431;
Treaty of Cooperation, March 2, 1936, T.S. No. 945; Treaty of Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955,
T.I.A.S. No. 3297. The latter is an authorization measure under which there is a permanent
appropriation. See S. REP. No. 1074, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1955). Professor Henkin states
simply that a treaty "can appropriately serve as legislation authorizing the subsequent
appropriation." FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 72, at 406.
"'See note 19 supra & text accompanying.
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and consent to international agreements-or to refuse to do so-is
conferred by the Constitution only on the Senate, not on the House of
Representatives."' 1 4
This has always been, and will continue to be, an area of great
difficulty. Since clear lines between treaty and executive agreement are not
available, it is important that the executive and legislative branches,
through consultation, seek common ground to the greatest possible extent
in resolving these issues.
THE LEGISLATIVE VETO PROPOSALS
There are many proposals pending in Congress which would authorize
the legislative veto. Of the bills providing for a legislative veto over
executive agreements, the measure which at this writing appears to have the
best chance of serious consideration is the Morgan-Zablocki bill. However,
the following analysis applies in large measure to the Bentsen and Glenn
bills described above." 5
The Legal Adviser pointed out in the House hearings on the Morgan-
Zablocki bill that "[o]ne of the most disturbing features of these hearings
has been the apparent assumption by several witnesses that a legislative
role for the Congress in approving or disapproving executive agreements
requires a legislative veto by one or both Houses."" 6 Clearly agreements
within the competence of the Congress may be appropriately invalidated by
a subsequent statute or by joint resolution. While the joint resolution
procedure, if based upon a sixty day waiting period, which not be desirable
on policy grounds, it would not raise the central constitutional question of
the Morgan-Zablocki bill. In addition, the power of the purse enables
Congress to refuse funding for any executive agreement; this protection is
very real since almost all significant agreements require funding. Thus, it
is incorrect to assume from the outset that a legislative veto is the only
method by which the Congress may assert a role in disapproving
agreements.
All of the current legislative proposals contain the legislative veto, and
that feature is their central constitutional defect. The relevant constitu-
tional clause, the "presentation clause", provides:
Every order, resolution or veto to which the concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him or being
disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and
11494 CONG. REc. S5745 (1976).
"
5See notes 13-15 supra & text accompanying.
161976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 175.
1977]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed
in the case of a bill." 7
It should be noted that the presentation clause is immediately preceded by
the well-known requirements for the enactment of a "bill" into law." 8 The
intent of the presentation clause, according to James Madison, was to avoid
precisely what the legislative veto entails - the circumvention of the
possibility of a presidential veto by characterizing enactments intended to
have the force of law as resolutions, votes, orders, or anything other than a
"bill."11 9
Unlike the long and judicially sanctioned practice of concluding
executive agreements, the congressional enactment of legislative vetoes is
recent, never judicially sanctioned and sharply controversial. Indeed, from
1789 until the early 1930's, although proposals were occasionally made for
legislative vetoes, it was assumed that a concurrent or one-House resolution
would not have the force of law. In 1897 a Senate Judiciary Committee
report stated that concurrent resolutions were used for issues "in which
both Houses have a common interest, but with which the President has no
concern."' 20 In 1973 the Congressional Research Service of the Library of
Congress said that the word "necessary" in the presentation clause means
necessary if an order, resolution or vote is to have the force of law.' 2' Erwin
Griswold, former Dean of the Harvard Law School and Solicitor General of
the United States, said in recent congressional testimony:
Concurrent resolutions are fine for saying that the Congress will adjourn
on January 18 at 12 noon or that the Congress will meet in joint session to
hear an address by the President of the United States. But as far as making
law is concerned, I don't have any feeling that a concurrent resolution has
any more standing than any other statement by a group of fine citizens. 22
It is true that on occasion Presidents have acquiesced in the adoption of
legislation containing the legislative veto, although this has normally been
for political reasons or because of the felt necessity to have a particular
statute passed. In his testimony before the Zablocki subcommittee, the
Legal Adviser cited the best known example of this: President Roosevelt's
approval of the 1941 Lend-Lease Act, in spite of his belief that one
'"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
"'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
"'See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 301-305 (rev. ed.
1937). See also 1975 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 184 (statement of Assistant Attorney
General Antonin Scalia).
120S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1897).
121CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 127-28 (1973).
122Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm. on the Termination of the National
Emergency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 746 (1973).
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provision violated article I, section 7 of the Constitution. At the time of
approval President Roosevelt wrote an internal memorandum setting forth
his constitutional objection, and in 1953 this memorandum was made
public by Attorney General Jackson."5 In sum, the short, controversial and
untested practice that we have had since the 1930's, and far more recently in
foreign affairs statutes, would not appear to match almost 150 years of
practice which deemed the legislative veto to be constitutionally inappro-
priate.
Other arguments have been raised in support of the legislative veto
technique. It has been suggested that such a veto is legitimate if provided
for in a statute duly approved by the President or passed over his veto. 24
But a constitutionally doubtful provision is not rendered less doubtful by
reason of its inclusion in a statute, whether or not approved by the
President. As the Legal Advisor argued: "Under this theory . . . the
Congress might just as well pass a statute permitting it to veto by
concurrent resolution Supreme Court decisions it did not approve of."'
It might also be argued that since Congress may prohibit certain types
of executive agreements by statute, it may appropriately take the lesser step
of providing for a legislative veto of such agreements. But the right to
prohibit a measure does not, of course, carry with it a right to attach
unconstitutional conditions. This theory would permit Congress to grant
the right of veto to a single committee, to a single member of Congress or
even to a committee staff member. Clearly such veto rights would
constitute less stringent measures than barring an agreement altogether,
but clearly these would be unconstitutional measures.
One of the commonly heard arguments in support of the legislative
veto is based upon a delegation of powers concept. 26 The argument is that
in areas over which Congress has jurisdiction, it may delegate its power to
the President while retaining a measure of control through the legislative
veto. But once again, delegating a power cannot carry with it a right to
retain a lesser power specifically prohibited by the Constitution. The
contrary argument is analogous to the viewpoint that the veto is justified as
a lesser step than outright prohibition.
In any event, in the area of international agreements it is difficult to
apply a theory of delegated powers. The Congress can neither negotiate
nor conclude international agreements and there is, therefore, no such
power to delegate to the President. These are executive powers, and the
InSee Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1353 (1953).
12 4For example, Ann Holland, a witness at the 1976 House hearings, argued that "[W]hile
the legislative veto has the force of law, it derives its force from the enabling act, in this case
from a law such as that proposed in the form of H.R. 4438." 1976 House Hearings, supra note
1, at 111.
1MId. at 177.
1261d. at 112-13, 114-15.
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Morgan-Zablocki bill does not and could not constitutionally involve a
delegation by the Congress of such powers. As Professor John Bassett
Moore wrote in 1921: "As Congress possesses no power whatever to make
international agreements, it has no such power to delegate."'' 2 7 Congress
may, of course, authorize the President to conclude agreements in specific
areas over which it has jurisdiction, but authorization and delegation are
not 'the same.128
It has been argued that the presentation clause is not violated by a one-
House veto, since that clause refers only to orders, resolutions or votes to
which the concurrence of both Houses may be necessary. 129  This
proposition appears to rest upon an assumption that Congress may do
anything the Constitution does not specifically forbid. The best response
to this argument was stated by H. Lee Watson in his outstanding study of
the legislative veto:
It verges on irrationality to maintain that action by concurrent resolution,
whereby Congress is at least held in check by its own structure, is invalid
because the veto clause so states, but that the invalidity of a simple
resolution, wherein a single House acts without check, is more in doubt.130
The "necessary and proper" clause13' has been cited in support of the
legislative veto. 32 But clearly that general clause cannot appropriately
supersede the very specific procedural requirement found in the presenta-
tion clause.13'
12'As quoted from Treaties & Presidential Agreements, supra note 77, at 201.
128That is to say, while every delegation constitutes an authorization, the reverse is not
true. If Congress does not authorize international agreements on a given subject within its
competence, it cannot make the agreement itself. It may authorize agreements, but since it
does not have the power to negotiate and conclude agreements itself, it has nothing to delegate
in this area. In brief, it is necessary to distinguish competence over a given subject matter
from competence over the process of negotiating and concluding international agreements.
The latter are executive branch functions which cannot be delegated by a Congress which does
not have such powers.
1291976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 116-17.
13°Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63
CALIF. L. REv. 983, 1066 n.428 (1975).
131U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
'"See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 131 (statement of Professor Ruth Bartlett).
'"See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976):
[T]he claim that Congress may provide for this manner of appointment under the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I stands on no better footing than the claim
that it may provide for such manner of appointment bcause of its substantive
authority to regulate federal elections. Congress could not, merely because it
concluded that such a measure was "necessary and proper" to the discharge of its
substantive legislative authority, pass a bill of attainder or ex post facto law contrary
to the prohibitions contained in § 9 of Art. I. No more may it vest in itself, or in its
officers, the authority to appoint officers of the United States when the Appoint-
ments Clause by clear implication prohibits it from doing so.
Id. at 135.
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The argument was also advanced that the statute could stipulate that
the Congress was required to approve executive agreements by resolution,
rather than express disapproval, during the sixty day waiting period. 34 It is
submitted, however, that the presentation clause prohibits this procedure as
well. Once again, a congressional resolution must have the approval of the
President or be passed over his veto if it is to have the force of law. As the
Legal Adviser noted, the President "is, after all, under the Constitution part
of the legislative process."' 35
Another obvious constitutional problem with the Glenn and Morgan-
Zablocki bills is that they do not exclude from their coverage agreements
concluded pursuant to the President's independent powers. Such agree-
ments may not be invalidated by concurrent resolution or even by statute.
The bills also entail serious practical problems. They appear to be
applicable in war as well as in peacetime, and yet in the past the President,
utilizing his Commander in Chief power, has concluded many agreements
essential to the conduct of war or other armed conflict. Surely it is not
practical for the President to submit such agreements to the Congress for a
sixty day waiting period, nor is it constitutionally required, at least under
circumstances in which Congress has approved a declaration of war.
Similarly, armistice and ceasefire agreements appear to be covered, but as
noted, they must be timed precisely and cannot reasonably be subjected to a
sixty day or even a ten day period during which they would be subject to
possible congressional disapproval.
These problems are compounded by the broad coverage of the bills,
particularly the Glenn bill,"16 which do not permit distinctions between
agreements of significance and the great bulk of routine technical agree-
ments that are of little interest to the Congress. Even the Morgan-Zablocki
bill, while purporting to limit its application to "national commitments,"
defines such commitments so broadly that even the most trivial provision
of economic assistance would fall within its ambit. The Department of
State noted that:
The 60-day waiting period would greatly complicate the rapid resolution
of everyday practical problems. Some of these are of a routine nature that
require only a simple exchange of notes, perhaps to compose a small
difference by adopting a minor amendment to a previously concluded
executive agreement itself of a routine nature. 37
The President's authority as negotiator for the nation would also be
eroded should any of the bills be enacted into law. The United States
1341976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 76.
1id. at 178.
136See notes 13-18 supra & text accompanying.
131976 House Hearings, supra note 1, at 301.
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would find it far more difficult to obtain concessions from other govern-
ments because it would be unable to give firm commitments. The risk of
delicate compromises coming unravelled would increase. Indeed, the
United States would become the only nation in the world unable to enter
into international agreements by signature or on short notice."8 There is
very little to be said in favor of this kind of unilateral restriction on the
President's capacity to negotiate with foreign nations.
In addition, the Morgan-Zablocki bill would, if enacted, almost
certainly generate confusion in the administration of legislation which
regulates various national commitments of the United States. The bill
appears largely superfluous in the sense that most, if not all, of what would
constitute a "national commitment" under the bill is already regulated by
separate statutory enactments, including the areas of military sales, 3 9 arms
control, 40 atomic energy,' 4' foreign economic assistance, 4 2 fishing agree-
ments 43 and trade. 144  Legislative vetoes, while not approved by the
executive branch, already exist in several of these areas. The Legal Advisor
asked, in his testimony on the Morgan-Zablocki bill:
ISBAt the 1975 Senate hearings on the Glenn and Bentsen bills, the Department of State
Legal Adviser, Monroe Leigh, made this point. In a reply, Senator Glenn said to Mr. Leigh:
"In your prepared statement you indicated how much this would tie the President's hands,
[sic] the United States would be the only nation in the world unable to enter into any
international agreement whatsoever, either on signature or on short notice. You betcha, that
is exactly the purpose of this." Senator Glenn then went on to defend the bills on the basis of
"uncertainty" on the part of foreign nations as to what U.S. commitments are, and the need
for a "partnership" with Congress on such commitments. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra
note 1, at 49.
'
39Under the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2776), foreign military sales over $25
million may be vetoed by Congress within thirty days.
reArms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2551 et seq. (1970). Cf. Section 33 of
the Act 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1970) which provides, inter alia, that:
no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United
States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the
United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under
the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the
Congress of the United States.
'
41Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1970). See section 123(d) of
the Act, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1970), which gives Congress the power to veto proposed
agreements for cooperation by concurrent resolution.
142See the several Foreign Assistance Acts, compiled in SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATION
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (joint Comm. Print 1976).
"
5 Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (to
be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.). Under Title II of the Act, Congressional oversight of
fishing agreements is established by means of a requirement that fishing agreements are
subject to a sixty day waiting period prior to entry into force and that the Congress may, by joint
resolution (subject to veto by the President), prevent their entry into force. Id. §§ 201, 206 (to be
codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1826).144See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191 et seq., 2211 et seq. (Supp. V 1975), which
establish a significant Congressional capability to override certain executive branch actions.
Examples of actions that could be overridden by a majority vote of both Houses include
decisions by the President not to provide import relief or import relief other than that
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Would an atomic energy agreement be subject to veto by Congress under
the terms of the Atomic Energy Act or under the terms of H.R. 4438?
Which is the governing law? The differences between existing statutes and
H.R. 4438 may be quite significant. Under the Arms Export Control Act
of 1976, foreign military sales over $25 million may be vetoed by Congress
within 30 days. Public Law 94-329 (22 U.S.C. 2776). But H.R. 4438
provides for 60 days in which Congress may veto. Which period is
applicable? Even more anomalous, Congress has 30 days to consider and
possibly veto sales in excess of $25 million pursuant to the Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, but 60 days to consider and perhaps veto sales of less
than $25 million under H.R. 4438. Logic would allow a longer time for
Congress to consider the larger sale.145
It would appear inevitable that the Morgan-Zablocki bill or any of the
variations that have been suggested so far would introduce uncertainty and
conflict on jurisdictional grounds, not only between the executive branch
and the Congress but also among various committees of Congress. The bill
either would have to be coordinated with all other statutes regulating
foreign commitments or it would have to supersede them. It is submitted
that the wiser approach is to proceed as Congress has to date by regulating
each area in detail, rather than by subjecting every possible commitment to
a very general procedure which is necessarily without specificity and which
cannot constitute effective and meaningful regulation.
The Legal Adviser noted in his statement on the Morgan-Zablocki bill
that this kind of legislation "fails, in my view, because it attempts too
much." He asserted:
It tries to regulate every commitment of any significance, but naturally
does so without specificity, because it would be impossible to put the
necessary detail into one statute. Congress has already regulated in great
detail most areas of national commitment, and by treating each area
separately, has been able to establish meaningful and effective rules. In our
view, it is far better to proceed as Congress has done to date - that is,
study each area carefully, and write detailed, specific regulations for its
governance. That is a far better approach than an across-the-board
attempt to reach everything in one law.' 46
While the alternative of requiring detailed legislation may be more
burdensome for the Congress, it is surely more consonant with the
recommended by the International Trade Commission and decisions by the President to
retaliate against foreign countries (discriminating against U.S. commerce) on a most-favored-
nation basis rather than against the specific offending country. In addition, both Houses
must approve by concurrent resolution the extension of trade benefits under future trade
agreements negotiated with nonmarket countries, and either House may veto the extension of
benefits to nonmarket countries which have entered into trade agreements prior to the
enactment of the Trade Act.
14-1976 House Hearing, supra note 1, at 180.
146d.
19771
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
constitutional concept of separation of powers and in the end more likely
to prevent any possible abuse by the executive branch.
THE CLARK RESOLUTION
It is submitted that the resolution 147 recommended by Senator Clark,
while purporting only to establish an internal Senate rule of procedure,
would also raise complex legal and policy questions if adopted. 48 The
Clark Resolution would constitute a very significant and unwise inter-
ference with the role of the House of Representatives. Since most
international agreements are authorized by statutes approved by both
Houses of Congress, it seems apparent that the statutory purpose would be
frustrated in any case in which the Senate redesignated an executive
agreement authorized by statute as a treaty. Further, since the Senate could
designate individual or classes of agreements as treaties, any House
judgment as to how existing statutory authority might be changed in the
future could be rendered irrelevant by the Senate action contemplated in
the Clark Resolution. The House role would be greatly weakened if not
completely eliminated in particular cases.
Perhaps even worse from the House of Representatives' point of view
are current statutes which specifically require the approval of both House
of Congress before agreements concluded thereunder may enter into
force. 49 Should the Senate designate any of these arguments as treaties, the
House role in this process would simply vanish. It is doubtful that the
House of Representatives would accept this kind of diminished role for
itself, and it is highly questionable whether the constitutional framework
of the legislative process may be stretched this far.
In hearings on the Clark proposal before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the Legal Adviser pointed out that one possible House
response might be to react in kind. The House of Representatives could
simply establish a rule permitting it to give treaties another designation,
which would in turn trigger a point of order procedure permitting any
single House member to block the funding for that treaty. Such a House
procedure would be equally objecti6nable since it would improperly
interfere with the role of the Senate in approving treaties.
Even more clearly, the Clark Resolution raises constitutional questions
with respect to agreements concluded by the President pursuant to his
147 S. Res. 486, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 122 CONG. REC. S11415-11417 (daily ed. June 30,
1976).
148The full text of the Department of State Legal Adviser's statement to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on the Clark proposal is available at the Office of the Legal
Adviser or at the office of the Committee.
149E.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970). See also
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (to be
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.).
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independent constitutional powers, such as ceasefire or recognition agree-
ments. The Senate may not appropriately redesignate such agreements as
treaties.
It is submitted that the Clark Resolution would also permit an unwise
and legally questionable interference with the role of the President who,
under the Constitution, "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur."150 The Constitutional Convention specifically granted the
power to make treaties to the President, although with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 51  Senator Clark's proposal would appear to
constitute a significant step backward to the system prevailing under the
articles of Confederation.
Most fundamentally, the Clark Resolution would take from the
President and grant to the Senate the final decision as to whether any
particular arrangement with a foreign country should be in treaty form.
Since the question of treaty or executive agreement involves not only legal
questions but important political and negotiating variables touching on
our relationship with foreign nations, a Senate redesignation of an
executive agreement as a treaty would constitute a very significant and
questionable interference with the negotiation process. As noted, even
Senator Ervin, who introduced a bill proposing a legislative veto over
international agreements and who was a strong critic of executive branch
practices in this area, supported the statement of his Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers that "it is the prerogative of the executive to conduct
international negotiations; within that power lies the lesser albeit quite
important, power to choose the instrument of international dialog."' 52
Within the limits noted above, 153 that statement is correct as a matter of law
and sound policy.
Senator Clark's proposal also presents a difficult legal issue concerning
Senate rules of procedure. While the two Houses unquestionably have very
broad discretion in deciding upon their own internal rules, it is clear that
such rules must be consistent with the Constitution. 154 Since it is required
150U.s. CONST. art II, § 2.
"s'See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 171 (1913)
(discussion of the Convention). Professor Henkin states that the Founding Fathers were
"eager to abandon treaty-making by Congress which, under the Articles of Confederation,
appointed negotiators, wrote their instructions, followed their progress, approved or rejected
their product.... And so, the Constitution gave the power to make treaties to the President
but only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present." FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
supra note 72, at 129.
152SuBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POwERS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D
CONG., lsT SESs., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 6 (Comm. Print 1973).
See also notes 106-111 supra & text accompanying.
"'See Id.
"
4See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892), in which it was held that each House
"may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
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that all legislation, including funding measures, receive a simple majority,
a Senate rule requiring 100 percent approval of any type of legislation
would be unconstitutional. The Clark Resolution is questionable because
it establishes such a 100 percent rule on funding legislation to implement
legally authorized executive agreements simply on the basis of a non-
binding Senate resolution that a particular agreement should have been a
treaty. If the Clark Resolution is appropriate, then the voting rules may
always be changed, no matter how drastically, provided only that the
Senate first expresses its non-binding opinion on any question. 55 In
constitutional terms, I believe this to be a very dubious proposition.
Perhaps the net effect and central purpose of the Clark Resolution is to
compel the executiv6 branch to conclude every agreement as a treaty. Surely
a negotiator for a foreign government, if faced with the Clark procedure,
would rightly insist that his government take no chances with an executive
agreement since the Senate might redesignate it a treaty. The effect would
be to compel the United States to negotiate all or most agreements as
treaties notwithstanding statutory or other authority to conclude executive
agreements. This is hardly conducive to the effective conduct of United
States foreign policy or to the effective functioning of the government.
CONCLUSION
Despite his very critical analysis of the current American Presidency in
The Imperial Presidency, Arthur Schlesinger nevertheless rejects the
proposal of a legislative veto of executive agreements. He states: "Once
again willful use of presidential power had caused excessive congressional
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained." See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969).
55It has been argued that the normal majority rule will still prevail since it requires a
majority to adopt the Clark proposal to begin with, a majority to decide an agreement should
be a treaty, and a majority to uphold the point of order procedure should it be challenged in
the Senate. See S. Res. 486, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S11415-S11417 (daily ed.
June 30, 1976).
But as the Legal Adviser pointed out in his statement to the Committee:
[I]f the proposed procedure for funding is really subject to majority rule, why have
this unusual resolution at all? Why not continue with the normal and constitu-
tionally mandated procedure under which all legislation, including funding
measures, are subject to the normal majority procedure? The entire purpose of a
point of order procedure is to permit fewer than a majority, even one Senator, to
block a proceeding. It is quite misleading, in our view. to give the impression that
S. Res. 486 is simply, one more application of the normal majority rule.
Treaty Powers, Resolution: Hearings on S. Res. 486 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh. Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
It is clear that the Clark proposal provides for a majority at every point except the
funding votes on agreements designated as treaties. At that point a 100% rule applies.
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reaction [but] [t]he answer lay less in the establishment of rigid procedures
than in the re-establishment of comity.1' ' 56
Ultimately, if detailed regulation over specific areas proves insufficient
for the Congress, then the current conflict between the two branches over
international agreements will be resolved not so much by arriving at
definitive legal solutions to complex separation of powers issues, but rather
through an improved political process that entails an ongoing and
cooperative system of consultation on issues of significance. Whether the
question is the desirability of a particular agreement, or whether it should
be concluded as a treaty or executive agreement, or what kind of
implementation is. necessary or desirable, the most appropriate avenue to
an efficient and yet politically responsive method of international agree-
ment making, like all areas of foreign policy, is close communication between
the two branches.
The executive branch and the Congress should be engaged in a search
for mutually agreeable rules on consultation. As noted above,1 57 consulta-
tion with whom, on what issues, and for what purpose and effect are
difficult issues, but they can be resolved. Perhaps more regularized
briefings by high level officers of the Department of State including
information on any contemplated agreements of significance would be
helpful. The Department of State has repeatedly made such suggestions to
the Congress.
Legislation which fails because it attempts too much, because it
inhibits the President's essential power to negotiate for the nation, and
because it generates resistance and substantial controversy over as yet
unanswered constitutional questions, is not the answer. The nation does
not need additional constitutional controversy. It does require assurances
that the Congress and the executive branch are consulting and cooperating.
Developing an improved and meaningful system of "comity" should be a
central task of those responsible for the formulation and conduct of United
States foreign policy.
156A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 302, 303 (rev. ed. 1974).
157See notes 99-102 supra & text accompanying.
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